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11 Introduction
By the static 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of international trade, diﬀer-
ences in relative factor endowments across countries suﬃce to render trade Pareto-
superior to autarky, as long as the factor intensity of production is diﬀerent for
each commodity. While this model has proved to be a very popular starting point
for many theoretical and empirical studies, only a few studies in the literature have
investigated the validity of predictions of the standard HO model in a dynamic
framework. This lack of interest was possibly due to the fact that trade itself would,
in the long-run, eliminate the initial diﬀerences between relative factor endowments
of countries that are assumed to be identical in every other respect, thereby leaving
no further incentives for partners to continue trading (Chen [2]). This paper argues
that trade may continue to occur in the long-run if there are additional diﬀerences
to make factor proportions evolve over time, and shows that diﬀerential speed of
population growth between trading nations is one of the attributes that could lead
to such an evolution in relative factor endowments, guaranteeing the continuation
of trade in the long-run.
This is, in fact, an emperically relevant example to such attributes, as the United
Nations projections indicate that the existing gap between the population growth
rates in relatively labour-abundant nations of the developing world and relatively
capital-abundant developed nations are likely to remain visible even beyond the
year 2050. Even at present, labour forces in these areas continue to diverge as
population pyramids get reshaped with diﬀerential paces of growth in the shares of
people just reaching the working age, and of those that leave the workforce due to
ageing. The resulting variations in the age proﬁles of nations are also aﬀecting rel-
ative magnitudes of savings and capital accumulation, implying additional changes
in relative factor endowments (Kenc and Sayan [6]).
Although changes in relative factor endowments arising due to the diﬀerential
speed of demographic transition in developing and developed parts of the world
2are gradually becoming a major factor to aﬀect future patterns of trade,1 the dy-
namic trade literature has largely overlooked this issue so far (see Sayan [9] for a
brief survey of the literature). This paper aims to contribute to the literature by
extending the static HO model into a dynamic, overlapping generations set-up to
look into the role that the diﬀerences in the population growth rates across nations
could play as a determinant of long-run comparative advantages and to discuss the
validity of welfare predictions of the static HO model in the long-run.
For this purpose, we consider a world that is made up of two countries/regions
each producing two commodities by using capital and labour. We assume that
countries are identical in every other respect than the rates of population growth,
and study the implications of this for trade by solving the autarky and trade models
analytically. The economies we consider are populated by individuals that live for
two periods, and the population in each is allowed to grow constantly at a distinct
rate. Such an overlapping generations (OLG) structure capturing the changing
savings behaviour of individuals over the working and retirement phases of the life
cycle implicitly allows the share of savings in national incomes to diﬀer across coun-
tries, as diﬀerences in the speed of population growth induce variations in relative
shares of diﬀerent age groups in populations. Thus, relative factor endowments
evolve, due not only to the changes in labour supply, but also to the changes in
capital accumulation resulting from the changing age proﬁles of populations.
Investigation of the welfare implications of trade in the long-run within this set-
up is particularly interesting, as a number of studies based on OLG models with
stationary populations have previously suggested that trade would not necessarily
lead to mutual welfare gains, and might not even be Pareto-superior to autarky
in the long-run (see Mountford [7] and Sayan [8] for examples from the existing
1While this paper looks at the eﬀects of diﬀerential speed of demographic transition on future
patterns of trade, a recent paper by Galor and Mountford [4] reverses the question and tries
to explain the historically observed eﬀects of trade on variations in the speed of demographic
transition across countries.
3literature and more detailed discussions).
The organisation of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the
model, presents the closed form solutions for the case of autarky, and discusses the
implications of diﬀerential speed of population growth between countries. Section
3 presents the closed form solutions of the world model under the assumption of
free trade. Section 4 concludes the paper by evaluating the results from autarky
and trade scenarios.
2 Assumptions and Behavioural Equations of the
Model
We study the long-run equilibrium under each of autarky and trade, by using an
inﬁnite horizon overlapping generations model with perfect foresight. Since the
countries considered are initially assumed to be exactly the same in every respect
but population growth rates, solving the autarky model for one and ﬁnding the
sensitivity of the steady state value of each variable to changes in the population
growth rate would be enough to compare long-run autarky solutions across coun-
tries. So, we begin by listing the assumptions that are common to both countries,
and write the equations without indexing variables to countries.
Each country is assumed to be populated by individuals who live for two periods.
At every period t, a generation made up of Nt individuals is born. Population grows
at the constant rate n so that Nt = (1+n)Nt−1. For all periods t, individuals born
and living the ﬁrst period of their lives at time t inelastically supply a ﬁxed amount
of labour, earn labour income at the competitive wage rate, wt, and decide on how
to allocate it between the ﬁrst period consumption of goods 1 and 2 (c1yt,c2yt), and
savings, st, which bring interest earnings at the rate of rt+1 the next period. In the
second period, they retire and consume c1ot+1 units of good 1, and c2ot+1 units of
good 2 by spending all their capital income from previous period’s savings.
4On the supply side, two commodities are produced by using labour, L, and
capital, K, under constant returns to scale, Cobb-Douglas type production tech-
nologies that are the same across countries for each commodity but diﬀerent across
commodities. In other words, sectoral production technologies are common to both
countries but production is relatively capital-intensive in one sector, and relatively
labour-intensive in the other, just as in the original formulation of static HO model.
As diﬀerently from overlapping generations general equilibrium models in such
studies as Galor [3] and Azariadis [1], our formulation allows good 1 be used for
consumption as well as investment purposes.2 So, we take this good as the capital-
intensive one, whereas we take good 2 that serves as a consumption good alone, as
the labour-intensive one (see Sayan [8]).
Under these assumptions, consumption and production decisions and long-run
autarky equilibrium in each economy can be described as follows.
2.1 Consumption and Saving
Given the price, pt, of the consumption good (good 2) in terms of the investment-








subject to c1yt + ptc2yt + 1
1+rt+1(c1ot+1 + pt+1c2ot+1) = wt¯ l,
c1yt,c2yt,c1ot+1,c2ot+1 ≥ 0,
(1)
where 0 < θ < 1 and 0 < µ < 1.
The solution to this problem results in the following consumption decisions:
c1yt = µθwt¯ l, (2)




2While this makes the model relatively more realistic, it also adds to the complexity of the util-
ity maximisation problem, since the consumers are now required to decide how much to consume
of each good every period.
5c1ot+1 = (1 − µ)θ(1 + rt+1)wt¯ l, (4)




implying that the private saving rate is given by (1 − µ).
2.2 Production
Given the assumptions about production technologies listed above, sectoral outputs
X1t and X2t can be expressed in per capita terms as x1t = kα
1tl
1−α





(for 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1) where xit =
Xit
Nt , kit =
Kit
Nt and lit =
Lit
Nt for i = 1,2.
The value of parameter α is assumed to be greater than β to allow production of
investment-consumption good (1) to be relatively more capital-intensive than that
of the consumption good (2). By this notation, total labour supply at time t can
be written as Lt = Nt¯ l, where ¯ l shows the ﬁxed amount of labour inelastically
supplied by each young. Factor market equilibrium requires that k1t + k2t = kt
and l1t + l2t = ¯ l, which can be normalized to 1 without loss of generality. The
demands for labour and capital in each sector are characterized by the ﬁrst order
conditions for proﬁt maximisation. If labour and capital are perfectly mobile across
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and per capita outputs can now be written as x1t = l1tαp
α
α−β




2.3 The Autarky Equilibrium
A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a sequence {kt,pt}∞
t=0 that clears the goods’ mar-
kets at every period t, while satisfying the dynamics of the capital stock at time
t+1. Remembering that the fraction of income saved during the ﬁrst period of life





The clearance of the goods’ market in period t requires that per capita supply of
each good be equal to its respective per capita demand. Hence,
x1t = c1yt +
1
(1 + n)
c1ot + (1 + n)kt+1 − kt, (15)




Walras’ law allows us to focus on the market clearance condition for the consump-
tion good (good 2) alone. Substituting c2yt and c2ot from (3) and (5), using (7),
(12), (13), and remembering that x2t = l2tδβp
β
α−β























(1 − µ)(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ − )βδ
β−1. (20)










(1 − µ)(1 − β)δ
β. (22)
Remembering (17) and using (21) one can obtain a nonlinear diﬀerence equation in
terms of price ratios only. This equation characterizes the dynamics of our model














2.3.1 Steady-State Values of Key Variables under Autarky
The equilibrium steady state value of ps satisﬁes (23) with pt+1 = pt = ps. Ruling
out ps = 0, ps is given by
ps = Φ
α−β




as shown in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price ratio, ps, for this perfect foresight overlapping-
generations general equilibrium model with constant returns to scale production ex-
ists and is unique for all values of −1 < n and given values of α, β, µ, θ that lie
strictly between 0 and 1 such that α > β.
Proof:
Straightforward: Uniqueness follows from the closed form solution for ps in (24),
and the existence is assured by the fact that Φ > 0 for the given parameters.



































2.3.2 Population Growth Rates and Comparative Advantages
Corollary 1 The equilibrium relative price ratio, ps, is decreasing in the population
growth rate n.















∂n < 0 (see Appendix),
∂ps
∂n
< 0 for α > β. (33)
Thus, the equilibrium price of consumption good 2 decreases with n, implying that
the autarky value of ps will be lower in the country with a higher population growth
rate.
Given that production of good 2 is relatively labour-intensive, one can conclude
that the country with a rapidly growing population will have a relative cost advan-
tage in the production of labour-intensive commodities, whereas the country with
a slowly growing population will have a relative cost advantage in the production
of capital-intensive commodities. In other words, if we start with two countries
9that are identical in every respect except the population growth rates, the high-
(low-)population growth country will become labour-(capital-)abundant over time,
and have a comparative advantage/specialise in the production of labour-(capital)
intensive commodity, just as predicted by the static HO model.
Corollary 2 The steady state values of per capita capital, ks, and the wage rate,
ws, are decreasing in the population growth rate n, whereas that of the rental rate,
rs, is increasing in the population growth rate n.
The eﬀect of the population growth rate on the steady state value of per capita




















1+n < 0, and ∂Φ
∂n < 0, ∂ks
∂n < 0. Thus, the long-run
stock of capital per capita decreases as n increases.
The eﬀect of the population growth rate on the steady state wage rate, ws,










∂n < 0, ∂ws
∂n < 0. This means that low-population growth countries would
have a higher wage rate than high-population growth countries, explaining why
they would have a comparative disadvantage in the production of labour-intensive
commodities. This also implies that unequal population growth rates could induce
labour-migration from high- to low-population growth nations in the absence of
barriers to labour mobility (Sayan [8]).

















> 0 (see Appendix). Hence, countries with a
slowly growing population tend to have a lower rental rate on capital than countries
10with a rapidly growing population. This is what gives these countries a comparative
advantage in the production of capital-intensive commodities, and, in the absence
of restrictions to capital mobility, would encourage ﬂows of capital from capital-
abundant countries to labour-abundant countries. Furthermore, capital ﬂows in-
duced by population ageing in one region of the world can transmit the growth and
resource allocation eﬀects of ageing globally, as suggested before by Tosun [10] and
Kenc and Sayan [6].
Corollary 3 The equilibrium per capita consumptions by youngs of good 1, c1ys,
and good 2, c2ys, are decreasing in the population growth rate n, whereas the equi-
librium per capita consumptions by the elderly of both goods are ambiguous in the
population growth rate, n.
The ﬁrst period equilibrium consumptions of both goods decrease in the population
growth rate. This inverse relationship between n and equilibrium values of young
generation’s consumption follows from the negative relationship between the wage
rate and n in the case of good 1, and from the fact that the population growth rate
elasticity of the price ratio is higher than the population growth rate elasticity of
the wage rate in the case of good 2.
The second period equilibrium per capita consumption of good 1 is decreasing
in n, if Φ > (1 − 2α)α−1, and is increasing in n, if Φ < (1 − 2α)α−1. Similarly,
the second period per capita consumption of good 2 is decreasing in n, if Φ >
α
β(1 − α − β)α−1, and is increasing in n, if Φ < α
β(1 − α − β)α−1.3
As previously suggested by Jelassi and Sayan [5] and discussed in the following
sections, this uncertainty is, in fact, the reason why welfare eﬀects of trade between
two countries would not be as straightforward to predict as in the case of the static
HO model.
3See Section 5.4 in the Appendix for detailed derivations of the relationship between steady
state values of consumption variables and population growth rate, n.
113 Trade
We now suppose that the world is made up of two countries of the type described
above. We denote the countries S and F, and assume that they are similar in every
respect except for the population growth rates. We let the growth rate of slowly
growing population of country S be nS and that of fast growing population of
country F be nF. Opening of trade sets the worldwide demand for each good equal
to the respective worldwide supply. Hence, the world market clearing condition for

























, for i = S,F. (37)















, for i = S,F. (38)
where Xi
jt is total output of sector j (j = 1,2) in country i (i = S,F); Ki
t is capital
stock in country i; Ci
jyt is total consumption of good j by the young in country i,
and Ci
jot is total consumption of good j by the old in country i, all at time t.
Walras’ law allows us to focus on the market clearance condition for the con-



























t is population size of the young at time t in country i, and Ni
t−1 is popu-
lation size of the old at time t in country i. Given that free trade will lead to an
equalization of prices in both countries in each period, p∗
t = pS
t = pF
t , where pi
t is
the price of good 2 in terms of good 1, must hold true for every t. Similarly to the








































φ1 = µ(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ − ) + , (41)
¯ φ2 = (1 − µ)(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ − ), (42)
¯ φ3 = (1 − µ)(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ − )βδ
β−1, (43)
¯ φ4 = (1 − µ)(1 − β)δ
β. (44)
3.1 Closed Form Solutions under Trade
The equilibrium steady state world price ratio value p∗
s satisﬁes (40) with pt+1 =
pt = p∗
s. Ruling out p∗
s = 0, p∗
s is given by
p
∗
s = ¯ Φ
α−β
1−α, where ¯ Φ =
(
P
i(1 + ni)s)(¯ φ4 − ¯ φ3)
(
P
i(1 + ni)s+1)φ1 + (
P
i(1 + ni)s)¯ φ2
. (45)
Proposition 2 The equilibrium price ratio, p∗
s, for this perfect foresight world
economy model exists and is unique for all nF > nS > −1 and given values of
α, β, µ, θ that lie strictly between 0 and 1 such that α > β, and satisfy the interior
solution condition.
Proof:
Straightforward: Uniqueness follows from the closed form solution for p∗
s in (45),
and the existence is assured by the fact that ¯ Φ > 0 for the given parameters. An
interior solution with x∗
1s,i > 0 and x∗
2s,i > 0 for i = S,F would further require that
(1−µ)(1−α)












1−α for i = S,F, (46)
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3.2 The Role of Population Growth Rate under Trade
Corollary 4 Free trade increases the autarky relative price of labour-intensive
commodity 2 in the slow-population growth (capital-abundant) country S, and low-
ers it in the fast-population growth (labour-abundant) country F.
This can be easily seen by rewriting the expressions for the steady state relative
prices under autarky as
p
i




¯ φ2 + φ1(1 + n
i)
 β−α
1−α , for i = S,F, (53)
and the common relative price under trade as
p
∗




¯ φ2 + φ1
(1 + nF)s+1 + (1 + nS)s+1




Since nF > nS and α > β, pF
s < p∗
s < pS
s. This equation also indicates that
the higher the diﬀerence between the population growth rates is, the lesser the
increase in the relative price of commodity 2 for the high-population growth rate
country will be. This is a signiﬁcant ﬁnding, since it implies that for a high enough
diﬀerence between nF and nS, country F may start acting as a large country that
is capable of setting the terms of trade close to its autarky relative price ratio.
Corollary 5 Free trade leads in the long-run to
• an increase in (the steady state values of) per capita capital stock and the
wage rate, and a decrease in (the steady state value of) the rental rate in the
high-population growth rate country, and
• a decrease in the per capita capital, a decrease in the wage rate and an increase
in the rental rate for the low-population growth rate country.









¯ φ2 + φ1(1 + n
i)
− α
1−α for i = S,F, (55)









¯ φ2 + φ1
(1 + nF)s+1 + (1 + nS)s+1
(1 + nF)s + (1 + nS)s
!− α
1−α
for i = S,F,
(56)









s . This equation further implies that the higher the
diﬀerence between population growth rates is, the smaller (larger) the eﬀect on the
per capita capital stock of the high-population growth country, F (low-population
growth country, S) will be.
The steady state wage rate under autarky is given by
w
i
s = (1 − α)




¯ φ2 + φ1(1 + n
i)
− α
1−α for i = S,F. (57)
Since nF > nS, wF
s < wS




s = (1 − α)




¯ φ2 + φ1
(1 + nF)s+1 + (1 + nS)s+1




clearly indicating that wF
s < w∗
s < wS
s . In addition, equation (58) implies that
the reduction in the autarky wage rate experienced by the slow-population growth
country S will be relatively higher than the increase that the fast-population growth
country F would observe in its autarky wage rate after opening of trade. In other
words, trade would lead to a proportionately smaller change in the autarky value
of the wage rate in country F than in country S.




α−1(¯ φ4 − ¯ φ3)
−1

¯ φ2 + φ1(1 + n
i)

for i = S,F, (59)




α−1(¯ φ4 − ¯ φ3)
−1
 
¯ φ2 + φ1
(1 + nF)s+1 + (1 + nS)s+1
(1 + nF)s + (1 + nS)s
!
, (60)
15under trade. Since nF > nS, rF
s > rS
s . Once again, the common rental rate after
trade would settle between autarky values such that rF
s > r∗
s > rS
s . It is now
straightforward to see that the higher the diﬀerence in the population growth rates
between the trading partners is, the higher the eﬀect of trade on the rental rate of
the low-population growth rate country will be.
Thus, our model suggests, in line with the expectations based on the solution
of the autarky model as discussed in the previous section, that the high-population
growth rate country (F) will have a comparative advantage in the production of
labour-intensive consumption good 2, and the low-population growth rate country
(S) will have a comparative advantage in the production of capital-intensive good
1 that serves as both an investment good and a consumption good. Furthermore,
relative commodity and factor prices under trade will lie between corresponding
autarky values just as in the static Heckscher-Ohlin framework, but be closer to
the pre-trade values for country F in magnitude. This implies that trade creates
a tendency for the high-population growth rate country F to pull the values of all
variables towards its own steady state autarky values in the long-run. In fact, the
larger the diﬀerence between population growth rates is, the stronger this tendency
will get, enabling country F to behave as the large country setting the terms of
trade in the long-run.
The challenges that remain now are i) to show that trade may continue to
occur in the long-run despite the equalization of these prices under trade, as long
as population growth rates are diﬀerent, and ii) to compare welfare levels across
autarky and trade scenarios.
Corollary 6 The nations considered may continue trading in the long-run as a
result of the diﬀerences in population growth rates alone, as the initial pattern of
comparative advantages are preserved at the steady state.
To prove Corollary 6, it suﬃces to show that domestic markets will not clear.
Instead, each country will have an excess supply of one commodity (to be exported),
16and an excess demand for the other (to be satisﬁed through imports). Here, we
show only the long-run expression for the excess supply of good 2 by country F.
This is given by
Exs
H


























which is clearly positive for α > β. This implies that the country with a fast grow-
ing population (i.e., the labour-abundant-country) will export the labour-intensive
commodity 2, as expected.
Having shown that trade may continue to occur at the steady state, we can now
compare welfare levels across autarky and trade. Again, as expected from solutions
under autarky, it is not obvious that welfare results are consistent with the static
HO model.
Corollary 7 Free trade leads to
• a decrease in the per capita consumption by youngs of good 1 and good 2 in the
low-population growth rate country S, and an increase in the per capita con-
sumption by youngs of both goods in the high-population growth rate country,
F.
• an ambiguous eﬀect on the per capita consumption by olds of both goods in
both countries.
The long-run equilibrium value of per capita consumption of good 1 by the
youngs is given by ci
1ys = µθwi
s for i = S,F under autarky, and by c∗
1ys = µθw∗
s






1ys and a similar ranking can
be made for good 2. The long-run equilibrium value of per capita consumption
by the youngs is given by ci










s under trade. Since the real wage rate has been shown to decrease
















17Thus, trade leads to an increase (decrease) in the youngs’ consumption of both
commodities in country F (S) in per capita terms.
Such a ranking, however, is not easy to ﬁnd in the case of per capita consump-
tion of goods by the olds. For commodity 1, per capita consumption by the olds
under autarky is given by c1os = (1−µ)θ(1+ri
s)wi
s for i = S,F. Remembering that
trade leads to a decrease (an increase) in the long-run wage rate but an increase (a
dcrease) in the long-run rental rate for the slow-population growth (fast-population
growth) country, the overall eﬀect of trade on ci
1os, depends on whether the mag-
nitude of the population growth rate elasticity of gross rental rate is smaller or
greater than the magnitude of the population growth rate elasticity of the wage
rate.
Similarly, since per capita consumption of good 2 by the olds under autarky is
given by ci





s for i = S,F, the overall eﬀect of trade
on ci
2os would also depend the relative magnitudes of the population growth rate
elasticities of gross rental rate and the real wage rate. Thus, the welfare of the
low-population growth rate country may increase or decrease depending upon the
sign of the following derivative (see Appendix):
eus,n = µθec1ys,n + µ(1 − θ)ec2ys,n + (1 − µ)θec1os,n + (1 − µ)(1 − θ)ec2os,n,
= θews,n + (1 − θ)ews
ps ,n + (1 − µ)e(1+rs),n (62)
It is conceivable that eus,n < 0 may hold, unless there are additional restrictions
on the values of parameters. Therefore, a country with a low population growth
rate may very well face a reduction in its autarky level of welfare after beginning
to trade with a high-population growth rate country.
4 Conclusions
Our discussion of the closed form solutions to the 2x2 and 2x2x2 OLG models in the
paper has shown that of the two countries/regions that are identical in every respect
18except the population growth rates, the high-(low-) population growth country will
become labour-(capital-) abundant over time, and must be expected to have a
comparative advantage in the production of labour-(capital-) intensive commodity,
as suggested by the static HO model. Furthermore, we have shown that as long as
the population growth rates are diﬀerent, there will be room for trade to continue
to occur in the long-run. Unlike what static HO model predicts, however, trade
will not necessarily make both countries better oﬀ in the long-run and our analysis
has revealed the reasons underlying this.
The analysis in Section 2 has shown that when the model is solved under au-
tarky, diﬀerences in the population growth rates alone are observed to give rise
to comparative advantages by leading to diﬀerent relative prices across countries,
regardless of initial population sizes of trading countries. In other words, the only
diﬀerence in demographic characteristics that matters for the direction of product
and factor ﬂows is the one between population growth rates. An examination of the
sensitivity of the steady state value of relative price ratio under autarky to changes
in population growth rate will indeed identify directions of comparative advantages
correctly.
While the population size does not directly aﬀect the long-run equilibrium, the
discussion in Section 3 about the changes that the opening of trade introduced to
relative commodity and factor prices prevailing under autarky hinted that initial
population sizes of trading nations may play a role in determining the gains from
trade. That’s because trade creates a tendency for the high-population growth rate
country F to pull the values of all variables towards its own steady state autarky
values in the long-run. In fact, we have shown that this tendency will get stronger,
the larger the diﬀerence between population growth rates. This implies that country
F has the potential to behave as a large country capable of setting the terms of
trade in the long-run, as a result of the parallel growth in its share of total world
output and population. Symmetrically, the low-population growth rate country S
will become a small country, and will begin to act as a price taker in trade. Thus,
19unless there is a large enough diﬀerential in initial population sizes, fast growing
population of country F will soon overtake country S in size, and the diverging
population sizes will lead to a divergence in the shares of countries in total world
output. If the resulting diﬀerence between these shares becomes suﬃciently large
before the steady state is reached, country F will begin to act as the price setter,
thereby driving all results. Such a dominance will cause welfare of the world to
converge to the autarky welfare of country F, creating welfare losses for country S.
It would therefore be correct to argue that initial population size would matter in
determining the nature of gains from trade, even though direction of trade itself is
determined by diﬀerences in population growth rates alone
In summary, the analysis in this paper has shown that demographically induced
diﬀerences in relative endowments by themselves may not be suﬃcient for trade to
be beneﬁcial to both parties in the long-run, and oﬀered a new explanation for this,
adding to previously suggested reasons as to why trade may not be Pareto-superior
to autarky in a dynamic, OLG set-up.
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5.1 The steady state price ratio
Proof:
The analytical solution of the steady state price ratio ps can easily be obtained by
rearranging terms of (23). This results in
































Since an equilibrium value ps (steady state value) is such that pt+1 = pt = ps and
satisﬁes (23) it follows that
ps = Φ
α−β
1−α, where Φ =
φ4−φ3
φ1+φ2. (65)
Now, (65) shows that ps is unique for any given set of parameter values. For
existence, we also need to show that ps is positive for any 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1,
0 < µ < 1, 0 < θ < 1 and −1 < n. Φ > 0 if and only if φ4−φ3 > 0 and φ1+φ2 > 0
or φ4 − φ3 < 0 and φ1 + φ2 < 0. Now, φ4 − φ3 > 0 ⇔
1
1 + n




(1 − µ)(1 − θ)(1 − β)β(δ − )δ
β−1
δ
β > (1 − θ)β(δ − )δ
β−1















(1 − θ)(β − α)
(1 − α)





1−θ > 1, and 0 < β < 1. Then, 1−αθ
1−θ > β holds for any given α, β and θ.
Thus, φ4 − φ3 > 0 for any given 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1, 0 < µ < 1, 0 < θ < 1 and
−1 < n.
Similarly, φ1 + φ2 > 0 ⇔
µ(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ − ) +  +
1
1 + n
(1 − µ)(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ − ) > 0
(δ − )

µ(1 − θ)(1 − β) +
1
1 + n
(1 − µ)(1 − θ)(1 − β)




































(1+µn)(1−θ) > 1, 1− 1+n
(1+µn)(1−θ) < 0. But
β
α > 0, and hence,
β
α > 1− 1+n
(1+µn)(1−θ)
holds for any given values of α, β, µ, θ and n. Thus, φ1+φ2 > 0 for any given α, β,
µ, θ, and n. Therefore, ps > 0 for any given α, β, µ, θ, ¯ l and n, where 0 < α < 1,
0 < β < 1, 0 < µ < 1, 0 < θ < 1, and −1 < n.
5.2 the sign of ∂Φ
∂n
First of all,
φ4 − φ3 =
1
1 + n
(1 − µ)(1 − β)

δ
















(1 − µ)(1 − β)(δβ − (1 − θ)β(δ − )δβ−1)




(1 − µ)(1 − β)δβ[1 − (1 − θ)β(1 − 
δ)]
(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ − )(1 + nµ) + (1 + n)
.




−(1 − µ)(1 − β)δβ[1 − (1 − θ)β(1 − 
δ)][(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ − )µ + ]
[(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ − )(1 + nµ) + (1 + n)]2
=
−(1 − µ)(1 − β)δβ
 [1 − (1 − θ)β(1 − 
δ)][(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ
 − 1)µ + 1]
[(1 − θ)(1 − β)(δ
 − 1)(1 + nµ) + (1 + n)]2 .
Now,
1 − (1 − θ)β(1 −

δ
) = 1 −





1−α < 1, and 0 < 1 − θ < 1, so,
(1−θ)(β−α)
(1−α) < (1 − θ) < 1. Thus,
0 < 1 −




(1 − θ)(1 − β)(
δ












α. Thus, −(1−θ)µ < (1−θ)(β−α)
µ
α.
But (1 − θ)µ < 1. Hence,































245.4 The eﬀect of n on Consumption
5.4.1 Consumption of good 1 by young
We have
c1ys = µθwt.











5.4.2 Consumption of good 2 by young
The ﬁrst period equilibrium per capita consumption of good 2 is




Plugging the expressions for ws and ps in the above and taking the derivative with
respect to the population growth rate n results in
∂c2ys
∂n














∂n < 0. Thus,
∂c2ys
∂n
























Thus, the population growth rate elasticity of the wage rate is less than the popu-
lation growth rate elasticity of the price ratio.
255.4.3 Consumption of good 1 by old







The sign of ∂c1os

















































< 0 if Φ > (1 − 2α)α−1
> 0 if Φ < (1 − 2α)α−1
. (68)
5.4.4 Consumption of good 2 by old
Similarly,







The sign of ∂c2os



















































< 0 if Φ > α
β(1 − α − β)α−1
> 0 if Φ < α
β(1 − α − β)α−1
. (69)
5.5 Trade
5.5.1 Trade vs Autarky
First, we have nF > nS.
(1 − n
S) −
(1 + nF)s+1 + (1 + nS)s+1
(1 + nF)s + (1 + nS)s =
(1 + nF)s







(1 + nF)s+1 + (1 + nS)s+1
(1 + nF)s + (1 + nS)s , (70)
and
(1 + nF)s+1 + (1 + nS)s+1
(1 + nF)s + (1 + nS)s − (1 − n
F) =
(1 + nS)s





(1 + nF)s+1 + (1 + nS)s+1
(1 + nF)s + (1 + nS)s < (1 − n
F). (71)
5.6 Condition for eus,n to be positive
First of all, eus,n is given by
eus,n =
 
θα + (1 − θ)β
1 − α










∂n < 0, the following condition must hold for eus,n to be positive
Φ <
 
(1 − α)(1 − µ)





Rewriting the term in parentheses results in
(1 − µ) <
1
1 − α
(θ(α − β) + β). (73)
Since 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1 and 0 < θ < 1, we have 0 < θ(α − β) < θ for α > β.




1−α(θ(α − β) + β) <
θ+β
1−α.
5.7 Excess supply of good 2 by country F
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1 + nF +
1 − µ





Now, excess supply of good 2 by country F (ExsF
2 ) is total production of good 2






























































αα−1[(1 − α) − (1 − θ)(β − α)]
(
¯ N
µ(1 − θ)(β − α) + α
(1 − µ)












28Substituting the expression of ¯ Φ−1 into the inequality above and rearranging terms
yields   ¯ N
1 + nF − 1
!  







1+nF − 1 < 0, µ(1 − θ) + α
β−α < 0. Hence, µ(1 − θ) < α
α−β which is always
true for α > β, since µ(1 − θ) < 1 and α
α−β > 1. Therefore, ExsF
2 > 0 for α > β
and ExsF
2 < 0 for α < β.
29